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Prior to 2004, all Chief of Naval Operations maintenance availabilities used a firm-fixed 
price contract structure. These contracts resulted in significant cost overruns and schedule 
delays, and did not create the collaborative environment the Navy desired. In an effort to 
improve outcomes, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) created the Multi-ship, 
Multi-option contract, a long-term, cost-reimbursement contracting vehicle that was 
competitively awarded. 
In 2013, NAVSEA determined that although collaboration and ownership had 
improved, the Navy’s ability to manage growth had been underestimated. Commander, 
Navy Regional Maintenance Centers and NAVSEA 21 set out to create a contracting 
vehicle with firm-fixed price or fixed price award fee competitions via multiple award 
contracts and created the Multiple Award Contract–Multiple Order (MAC-MO) contract 
strategy. The purpose of this MBA project is to analyze MAC-MO contracts and 
compare/contrast them with previous strategies in order to determine the efficiency and 
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The Navy expended over $7.6 billion on surface ship maintenance contracts in 
fiscal year (FY) 2014 (Department of the Navy [DON], 2015, p. 120). To put this in 
perspective, that amount is approximately 17% of the Navy’s operation and maintenance 
(O&MN) budget (DON, 2015, p. 17) and nearly $1 billion greater than the Coast Guard’s 
entire operating expense account for FY 2014 (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 
2013, p. 144).  
Clearly, the Navy’s maintenance budget is quite large and requires a very high 
level of contract management. It is critical that the Navy employ the appropriate contract 
strategy in order to minimize cost overruns, maintain schedule, and ensure the highest 
quality of repairs for the fleet. This project looks into historical fleet maintenance 
contracting strategies and their evolution to current day practices.  
Prior to 2004, all Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) maintenance availabilities 
used a single ship, firm-fixed price contract structure. This essentially means that a 
maintenance contract was written on an individual basis for each ship, limiting the 
amount of available funding to conduct the scheduled maintenance. According to 
NAVSEA, this contract structure led to the following results:  
 excessive cost growth with variation in final contract cost  
 Navy–industry relationships that were contentious vice collaborative and 
had opposing objectives 
 no ownership of Navy objectives by the contractor (McManamon, 2009, 
slide 4)  
In an attempt to improve the maintenance procurement strategy for the CNO 
availabilities of surface ships, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and 
Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) consulted with commercial ship-line 
operators to create the Multi-Ship, Multi-Option (MSMO) maintenance strategy. MSMO 
was a competitively awarded, long-term, cost-reimbursement contracting vehicle. 
Admiral Robert Natter, former commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, stated that  
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multi-option, multi-ship contracting [would] mean a better end product for 
all of our ships going into the yards for repairs. … This form of 
contracting [would] enable us to more efficiently and effectively manage 
ships’ maintenance schedules, which [meant] improved readiness for 
operations. (Nagle, 2002, para. 6)  
As the primary maintenance procurement method for Navy surface ships from 
2004 to 2013, the MSMO strategy had several objectives: 
1. Support Fleet Readiness Plan (FRP) with improved maintenance readiness 
a. Long-term and accountable relationship 
b. Industrial base that is steady, flexible, and quick to react 
2. Develop a partnership mentality with contractor where the Navy is the 
primary customer 
a. Contractor allegiance with the customer  
3. Provide a predictable workload forecast 
a. Contractor investment in workforce and modernization of facilities 
(McManamon, 2009, p. 5)  
The basic structure of the MSMO contract was a single, long-term (five-year) 
contract that provided for maintenance and modernization services by ship class and 
homeport. A total of 20 MSMO contracts were awarded between FY 2004 and FY 2009 
at a total volume of $4.3 billion. The contracts used a cost-reimbursement strategy with 
an award fee incentive structure. In short, the contractors were reimbursed for all 
allocable, allowable, and reasonable costs expended, and were provided an opportunity to 
earn an extra fee for superb technical performance and superb management of the 
maintenance process. Fees were capped at 11.2%, and the average fee earned was 
approximately 9.5%. The contractor fee was considered at risk, or was not guaranteed to 
be paid by the government, and the fee payout was based on the Navy’s assessment of the 
contractor’s management system and technical performance. 
In 2013, NAVSEA determined that although collaboration and ownership had 
improved, the Navy had “significantly underestimated their ability to manage growth” (p. 
4) and the level of required “government resources and effort to effectively administer 
contracts and remain a smart buyer and peer of industry” (p. 4). Cost-reimbursement 
contracts require close management to ensure efficiency and avoid steeply escalating 
costs, and the Navy did not have the necessary resources to properly administer the 
MSMO contracts. 
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Once again, in an attempt to improve the maintenance procurement strategy for 
the surface maintenance, Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Centers (CNRMC) 
and NAVSEA set out to create another contracting vehicle, this time with firm-fixed 
price (FFP) or fixed price award fee (FPAF) competitions via multiple award contracts. 
The result of these efforts was the development of the Multiple Award Contract-Multiple 
Order (MAC-MO) contract strategy. The desire was to maintain the same Navy-industry 
collaboration objectives as the MSMO strategy while simultaneously controlling costs 
and leveraging the Navy’s limited contract administration resources. 
The basic structure of the MAC-MO contract is to compete and award multiple 
award contracts to qualified ship repair yards. Each CNO availability/Continuous 
Maintenance Availability (CMAV) is competed among multiple award contract (MAC) 
holders on the basis of past performance and proposed price. FFP and FPAF contracts are 
awarded for routine maintenance. The MAC-MO strategy also allows for the award of 
separate cost plus award fee (CPAF) contracts for non-routine, emergent maintenance 
and a CPAF/incentive fee (IF) contract for maintenance planning accomplished by a third 
party. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2009, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee (SASC) stated that the Navy had not established measures of effectiveness 
and appropriate cost control mechanisms to maximize the benefits promised by MSMO 
contract strategies.   
In response to the SASC statement and other executive leaders’ demands for 
improved maintenance, the Navy developed the MAC-MO contract strategy. MAC-MO 
successes and/or failures have not been identified, and therefore it is not known whether 
MAC-MO contracts are more effective and/or more efficient than their FFP or MSMO 
predecessors. This lack of information has also prompted the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy for Acquisition and Procurement (DASN[AP]), Elliot Branch, to request an 
assessment of MAC-MO contracts to determine their efficiency and effectiveness. In 
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short, the researchers seek to understand whether or not MAC-MO contracts provide the 
best value for surface ship maintenance for the Navy and the government. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The researchers used the following questions to guide the research and analysis: 
 Are MAC-MO contracts the most efficient and effective contracting 
method for CNO availabilities? 
 Are MAC-MO contracts meeting their objectives? 
 Are there any best practices from past successful MAC-MO contracts? 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This MBA project presents results from appropriate and relevant data, specifically 
information from ongoing and completed MAC-MO contracts that are related to the 
assessment requested by the DASN (AP). These data include cost, schedule performance, 
and lost operational days associated with each MAC-MO contract. Using these data, the 
researchers assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the MAC-MO strategy.  
The data were collected and analyzed to determine (a) if the objectives of the 
MAC-MO contract were met, and (b) if the MAC-MO strategy has improved 
effectiveness and efficiency of CNO maintenance contract procurement, as compared to 
the previous MSMO strategy. As a result of this research, Navy leadership will be able to 
(a) better understand the evolution of the Navy’s maintenance contracting strategies, (b) 
apply the lessons learned to future MAC-MO availabilities, and (c) perhaps aid in the 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION 
A literature review was conducted to better understand the Navy’s maintenance 
policy and previous ship maintenance contracting strategies, to include actual and 
expected outcomes of ship maintenance availabilities. This background information was 
used to develop a set of analytical tools necessary to study the MAC-MO contract. 
A.  MAINTENANCE POLICY 
A ship maintenance policy ensures that the Navy has capable and effective tools 
to protect the freedoms and execute the policies of the United States. The Navy’s 
maintenance program consists of two components to maintain the readiness of the fleet: 
ship maintenance and ship modernization. The budgets for each of the components are 
distinct from each other, but are closely related in terms of planning and execution. The 
Maintenance Policy for the United States Navy Ships, OPNAVINST 4700.7L, outlines 
the following as the scope of the maintenance program: 
 Ship maintenance procedures and policies are designed to ensure the 
safety of the crew and the ship while achieving the desired operational 
readiness levels at the lowest possible total ownership cost, consistent with 
public law and other directives. 
 The ship modernization program is designed to increase ship system 
capability and/or improve the reliability and maintainability of existing 
systems. Maintaining the integrity of the ship class configuration is also a 
requirement. (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations [OPNAV], 2010, p. 
2) 
This research focuses on MAC-MO contracts for depot-level maintenance 
availabilities. These maintenance periods are synonymous with CNO-scheduled depot 
availabilities, which require facilities, capabilities, or capacities that are beyond the 
shipboard and intermediate level. Depot-level maintenance can be comprised of, but is 
not limited to, both organizational and intermediate-level maintenance, as well as repair 
and modernization of the ship’s weapon systems, engineering and propulsion plants, 
auxiliary plants, and structural repairs. CNO availabilities can be performed in naval 
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shipyards or private shipyards and are comprised of a mix of government agents, original 
equipment representatives, and contracted labor.  
There are numerous types of CNO availabilities, and the Joint Fleet Maintenance 
Manual (JFMM) breaks them into two categories based on duration: 
1. CNO scheduled maintenance availabilities greater than six months in 
duration are: 
a. Overhaul—An availability scheduled for accomplishment of 
industrial maintenance and modernization. Types of availabilities 
include: 
i. Regular Overhaul 
ii. Complex Overhaul 
iii. Engineered Overhaul 
iv. Refueling Overhaul 
v. Refueling Complex Overhaul 
vi. Engineered Refueling Overhaul 
b. Other availabilities—An availability scheduled primarily for 
industrial maintenance and installation of major, high priority 
alterations. Types of these availabilities include: 
i. Depot Maintenance Period 
ii. Planned Incremental Availability 
iii. Docking Planned Incremental Availability 
iv. Extended Drydocking Phase Maintenance Availability 
v. Post Shakedown Availability 
vi. Carrier Incremental Availability 
2. CNO scheduled maintenance availabilities less than six months in duration 
include short, labor-intensive availabilities scheduled for accomplishment 
of industrial maintenance and modernization. These types of availabilities 
include: 
a. Selected Restricted Availability (SRA) 
b. Docking SRA 
c. Phased Maintenance Availability 
d. Docking Phased Maintenance Availability 
e. Service Craft Overhaul 
f. Extended SRA 
g. Extended Docking SRA 
h. Incremental SRA 
i. Extended Refit Period 
j. Post Shakedown Availability 
k. Pre-Inactivation Restricted Availability  
(Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command [CFFC], 2013, p. II-I-3-4) 
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A CNO availability is also comprised of multiple command and supporting 
organizations. The various entities each play a role in ensuring that the planning and 
execution of the depot-level maintenance period is successful. The following is a list of 
the key stakeholders and their major responsibilities: 
 CNO—Approve maintenance program master plans and monitor 
compliance. OPNAV staff documents availability durations, intervals, and 
repair man-days and controls schedule of CNO-scheduled availabilities. 
 Fleet Commanders (FLTCDR)—Coordinate required depot maintenance 
and operational requirements and monitor maintenance execution and 
ensure cost, schedule, and performance measures are achieved. 
 Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)—Serves as the lead technical 
authority, establishes performance standards for maintenance and/or 
modernization, and ensures agencies execute within the scope of work 
authorized. 
 Program Executive Office (PEO)/Project Manager (PM)—Determine 
realistic availability milestones that increase the likelihood of successful 
completion.  
 Executing Command and Contractor—Perform and monitor maintenance 
actions during the availability (OPNAV, 2010, pp. 12–20). 
B.  FIRM-FIXED PRICE CONTRACTS 
Contractors are a major element of successful ship maintenance, and the strategy 
used to procure their labor plays a critical role in the overall maintenance outcome. The 
initial surface ship maintenance agreement was a firm-fixed price (FFP) contract, which 
provided for little flexibility with regard to the contract’s final cost. 
1. Contract Strategy 
Prior to 2004, FFP contracts were the primary contracting vehicle for CNO 
availabilities. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR, 2015) defines FFP contracts as 
follows: 
A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any 
adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing 
the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk 
and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. It provides 
maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform 
effectively and imposes a minimum administrative burden upon the 
contracting parties. (FAR 16.202-1) 
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Essentially, FFP contracts set a price limit that the contractor is not to exceed. 
While the intent is to protect the Government from major cost overruns, FFP contracts 
are not effective for all types of requirements, particularly those that are not well defined. 
Congress and Department of Defense (DOD) leaders have instituted several laws 
and regulations either promoting or requiring the use of FFP contracts. A brief 
chronology of major legislation is as follows: 
 May 1985—The CNO directed that fixed-price contracts will be used for 
ship maintenance (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 1986, p. 4). 
 February 2009—The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
required maximum use of fixed-price contracts (American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, 2009, § 1554). 
 March 2009—President Obama issued a memorandum that discussed the 
risk of cost-reimbursement contracts and advocated preference for fixed-
price contracts (Obama, 2009, pp. 9755–9757). 
 October 2009—The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2010 
expressed that the Navy could more efficiently maintain its ships through 
fixed-price contracts (National Defense Authorization Act, 2010, § 1021).  
These statutes and regulations, in addition to the inherent low risk to the 
government associated with FFP contracts, were the driving forces behind the utilization 
of FFP contracts in surface ship maintenance. 
2. Incentive Structure 
The biggest advantages of FFP contracts are the allocation of risk and cost-
efficiency. Under an FFP contract, the contractor bears all of the risk of a cost overrun, 
and the government pays a firm, set price. FFP contracts are best suited for projects with 
well-defined requirements and experienced contractors. The biggest disadvantage is that 
the contractor is incentivized to perform exactly as the contract states, with no additional 
motivation to decrease schedule or increase technical performance. A contractor working 
under an FFP contract is motivated to decrease costs, as lower costs result in higher profit 
(i.e., whatever funding is not used in performance of the contract is the contractor’s to 
keep). 
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Although the incentive structure of an FFP contract is designed to give the 
government specifically what it requires for a specified price, in the case of CNO 
availability contracts, the final outcome of completed maintenance availabilities were not 
as expected. Allowing for very little scope flexibility, the FFP contract structure resulted 
in adverse outcomes when additional maintenance needs were discovered. 
3. Outcomes in Ship Maintenance 
FFP contracts for Navy ship maintenance received criticism from Navy military 
and civilian leadership in 2004 (McManamon, 2009, p. 4). The single-use, FFP contracts 
generally led to undesirable outcomes, including  
 excessive cost growth with variation in final contract cost  
 Navy–industry relationships that were contentious vice collaborative (as a 
result of having opposing objectives) 
 no ownership by the contractor of Navy objectives (McManamon, 2009, p. 
4) 
a. Cost Growth 
There are several reasons for cost growth in Navy maintenance contracts, three of 
which are primarily mentioned in MSMO concept material. The first is a lack of well-
defined requirements, the second is an increase in schedule, and the third is a lack of 
skilled workers and the learning-curve impact. 
1. Requirements Definition 
Well-defined requirements are essential in FFP contracts. When requirements are 
not well defined, FFP contracts are frequently modified to account for additional work. In 
their article, “The Importance of Contract Design,” Brown and Kim (2012) analyzed 
DOD fixed-price contracts and found that the DOD would “often dramatically increase 
the length and value of contracts through modifications to initial agreements. This 
approach forgoes the benefits of competition and exposed the agency to the risk of cost 
overruns, delivery delays, and diminished product quality” (p. 687). 
Poorly defined requirements—requirements that truly could not be defined 
beforehand—led to growth and new work in Navy maintenance contracts. CNRMC 
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defined growth work “as any additional work that is identified or authorized after contract 
definitization that is related to a work item included in the original contract 
definitization” (CNRMC, 2012, p. 1). For instance, if cracks or holes were discovered 
inside a ship’s fuel tank during shipyard corrosion control activities (e.g., grinding and/or 
sanding) and there was already a work item in the contract for crack or hole repair, then 
the requirement would be considered growth work. CNRMC’s definition of new work is 
similar to growth work except that the work is not related to items in the original 
contract. An example of new work is adding fuel tank repair to a combat systems 
equipment-specific maintenance availability. 
Prior to 2008, to cover unexpected growth work, the Navy would add a growth 
pool value to the total contract value (DOD Inspector General [DOD IG], 2008, p. 6). 
Once the growth work was identified, a contract modification would be issued and the 
growth pool money would be obligated. In April 2008, the DOD IG report noted that 125 
growth pool modifications were issued for a value of over $39 million, and a significant 
amount was obligated prior to a modification being issued (DOD IG, 2008, p. 6). The 
DOD IG also found that using growth pools violated 31 U.S.C. 1501; the DOD Financial 
Management Regulation (FMR), Volume 3, Chapter 8; 31 U.S.C. 1502; and the Joint 
Fleet Maintenance Manual (JFMM) because growth work was not associated with 
contract work items or tasks. Due to these findings, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
Financial Management and Comptroller (ASN[FM&C]) discontinued the use of growth 
pools and required that negotiated contract modifications be issued upon identification of 
growth work (DOD IG, 2008, p. 10). 
Regardless of the ASN(FM&C)’s decision to eliminate growth pools, growth 
work and new work continue to drive cost overruns in Navy maintenance availabilities. 
2. Schedule Overruns 
The second major cost driver is schedule overruns. In a study by Caprio and 
Leszczynski (2012) of aircraft carrier; attack submarine; and landing ship, dock (LHD) 1 
class ships maintenance availabilities at the four public naval shipyards, it was found that 
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between FY 2005 and FY 2011, only 10% to 45%, depending on the fiscal year reviewed, 
of 108 ships were completed on time (p. 1).  
Caprio and Leszczynski (2012) also found that schedule issues led to lower cost 
performance ratios. In their study, they measured performance by dividing the budgeted 
quantity of work performed (BQWP) by the actual quantity of work performed (AQWP). 
The cost performance was determined to be successful if the ratio was .95 or higher. In 
their report, they found that late availabilities had a cost performance ratio of .87 (Caprio 
& Leszczynski, 2012, p. 78). 
3. Labor Implications 
Another significant cost-driver for ship maintenance is the workforce. FFP 
contracts were typically less than a year in duration, providing no long-term stability for 
the labor force and creating lull time that negatively impacted the maintenance learning 
curve. The lack of stability made it difficult for shipyards to maintain competent 
personnel and created a reliance on temporary labor to supplement the workforce during 
increases in workload (GAO, 2011, p. 13). These temporary laborers increased the 
learning curve, thus adding time to the schedule and decreasing performance, ultimately 
negatively impacting overall contract price. The issues with shipyard labor also created 
long-term impacts to ship maintenance by decreasing improvement and innovation of 
maintenance techniques and processes (NAVSEA 21, 2008, slide 7). 
b. Navy Industry Relationships 
In 2009, NAVSEA 21 Commander, Rear Admiral James McManamon, called the 
relationship between the Navy and the ship maintenance industry “contentious,” and 
stated that contractors had a “bid low, grow hard” mentality (McManamon, 2009, slide 
4). The single-use FFP contracts provided no incentive to the maintenance community to 
perform at a high standard. The FFP’s total cost was already determined, and while the 
government maintained the goal of high quality performance, the contractor’s goal was to 
minimize costs in order to collect more profit. These misaligned goals compounded an 
already complex maintenance overhaul process.  
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c. Contractor Ownership 
Under the FFP contracts, the Navy took the lead for CNO availability planning, 
and the shipyards executed the plan. This setup allowed the contractor to work with an 
“execution only” mindset, removing the contractor from any ownership of, or insight 
into, the overall maintenance plan, as well as any problems that arose throughout the 
availability. The Navy needed a contract strategy in which the contractor owned the 
process from planning to execution, a strategy that would lead to better results for both 
parties (McManamon, 2009, slide 6). Hence, the Navy’s MSMO contract strategy was 
introduced.   
C.  MULTI-SHIP, MULTI-OPTION CONTRACTS 
1. Contract Strategy 
In 2004, CNSF was dissatisfied with surface ship maintenance and called upon 
NAVSEA to search for improvements in execution. NAVSEA consulted with 
commercial ship lines and shipyards to draw on best practices and lessons learned that 
could be applied to Navy maintenance (McManamon, 2009, slide 4).  
What NAVSEA found was that commercial ship lines use multiple-ship award 
and incentive contracts to maintain their fleets. For example, in October 2004, Australia’s 
North West Shelf Shipping signed a long-term maintenance and upgrade contract for its 
fleet of liquefied natural gas ships with Singapore’s SembCorp Marine. The five-year 
contract provided drydocking and other maintenance services for NWS’s nine-ship fleet 
at SembCorp Marine’s Sembawang and Jurong shipyards (Sembawang Shipyard, 2004, 
pp. 1–3). 
Another example of commercial ship line contracting strategies comes from the 
A.P. Moller-Maersk Group, also known as Maersk, which is the largest commercial 
shipping company in the world (Caulderwood, 2014, para. 1). With over 500 ships in its 
fleet, maintenance costs are substantial. Maersk uses multiple-ship contracts to reduce 
costs and increase efficiency. As a worldwide shipping company, it groups ships by their 
areas of operation and combines them all into a single repair or overhaul contract 
 13 
(Maersk Line, Limited, 2014, Government Ship Management section, para. 7). This 
contractual setup allows for increased competition and incentivizes the winning 
contractor to perform at the highest standards and lowest costs, particularly when the 
contractor’s receipt of future contracts is based on previous performance. 
Unlike the FFP contract structure that offered no incentives for the contractor to 
provide high quality service, the MSMO strategy used a cost-reimbursement contract 
with incentives to encourage the contractors to keep costs as low as possible while still 
providing high quality ship maintenance.   
2. Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 
The Navy has a variety of contract types to choose from when procuring ship 
maintenance. For the MSMO strategy, the Navy chose to use a cost-reimbursement type 
contract. The FAR (2015) states, “Cost-reimbursement contracts are suitable for use only 
when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated 
with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract” (16.301-2).  
Due to the uncertainties with the individual condition of each ship entering a 
depot-level maintenance availability, the MSMO cost-reimbursement contract (with 
incentives) became the vehicle of choice in an effort to gain greater efficiency, reduce 
waste, improve contractor motivation, and reduce cost. To better manage the risk inherent 
in cost-reimbursement contracts, a  
cost-reimbursement contract may only be used only when (1) the 
contractor’s accounting system is adequate for determining costs 
applicable to the contract, and (2) appropriate government surveillance 
during performance will provide reasonable assurance that efficient 
methods and effective cost controls are being used. (FAR, 16.301-3[a])  
The MSMO strategy used a cost-reimbursement contract due primarily to the 
uncertainty in requirements and was based on the premise that it would motivate the 
contractor to perform more efficiently. However, cost-reimbursement contracts were 
more complex than previous FFP maintenance contracts and therefore required additional 
oversight capacity that the Navy did not possess. This lack of surveillance made it 
difficult to effectively manage the MSMO contracts. 
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3. Incentive Structure 
According to the FAR, award fee and incentive fee contracts should be used to 
achieve specific cost, performance, and delivery objectives. Award fee contracts typically 
focus on “contractor performance in a wide variety of areas, such as quality, timeliness, 
technical ingenuity, and cost-effective management” (GAO, 2005, p. 6). Incentive fee 
contracts can be used to motivate contractors to achieve specific delivery targets or 
performance goals, but are typically used to focus on cost control (GAO, 2005, p. 6).  
FAR 16.304 defines a CPIF contract as “a cost-reimbursement contract that 
provides for an initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula based on the 
relationship of total allowable target costs to total target costs” (2015). 
Additionally, FAR 16.305 states that a CPAF contract  
is also a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of 
(a) a base amount (which may be zero) fixed at the inception of the 
contract and (b) an award amount, based upon a judgmental evaluation by 
the Government, sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in 
contract performance.  
The determination of the “fee” amount that is paid out is quite different when 
comparing a CPIF to a CPAF contract. The incentive fee under a CPIF structure is based 
on objective criteria that are included in the contract, while the award fee under a CPAF 
structure is based on a subjective evaluation of the contractor’s performance. 
Incentive contracts are used by government agencies, including the DON, as a 
tool to encourage contractors to complete their work in a more efficient manner. 
Incentives come in two forms: award fee and incentive fee. These are the only contract 
types that allow an agency to adjust how much a contractor is paid based on performance. 
“This contract type specifies a target cost, a target fee, minimum and maximum fees, and 
a fee adjustment formula” (FAR, 16.405-1[a]).  
There are certain conditions in which incentive contracts are appropriate. The 
FAR states that  
incentive contracts are appropriate when a firm-fixed price contract is not 
appropriate and the required supplies or services can be acquired at lower 
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costs and, in certain instances, with improved delivery or technical 
performance, by relating the amount of profit or fee payable under the 
contract to the contractor’s performance. (16.401)  
Consistent with the FAR, incentive contracts are designed to 
1. establish reasonable and attainable targets that are clearly communicated 
to the contractor 
2. include appropriate incentives designed to  
a. motivate the contractor’s efforts that might not otherwise be 
emphasized 
b. discourage the contractor from inefficiency and waste (FAR, 
16.401) 
According to the GAO (2005), “federal acquisition regulations state that award 
fee and incentive fee contracts should be used to achieve specific acquisition objectives” 
(p. 7), such as meeting cost goals, delivering specific capabilities, or meeting schedules 
(p. 7). The assumption associated with adding an incentive to a contract is that improving 
the odds of meeting acquisition objectives requires the use of a contract “that effectively 
motivates a contractor toward exceptional performance” (GAO, 2005, p. 7). Choosing the 
right incentive structure is critical to that motivation, as are the government’s ability and 
resources to properly oversee and rate the contractor’s performance. 
Incentives can be included in both fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts. 
It is usually to the government’s advantage to have the contractor assume a large amount 
of cost responsibility and an appropriate share of the cost risk,; therefore, a fixed-price 
incentive contract is the preferred contract vehicle in situations where contractor costs 
and performance requirements are deemed to be reasonably certain (FAR, 16.401[c]). 
Cost-reimbursement contracts, with or without incentives, move more of the cost risk to 
the government and lessen the amount of cost risk to the contractor. 
Depot-level maintenance periods are critical to ensuring continued material 
readiness of the Navy’s fleet. This makes it vitally important that incentives in depot-
level maintenance contracts are used appropriately while applying strong management 
practices to accomplish mission needs, maximize value, and minimize waste (Denett, 
2007, p. 1). This also makes depot level maintenance contracts candidates for the use of 
award fee or incentive fee elements. 
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The MSMO contract utilized a mix of award and incentive fees under a cost-
reimbursement contract type. Understanding the purpose and appropriate use of a cost-
reimbursement contract and the issues faced by the DOD is key to understanding the 
Navy’s use of the MSMO strategy and the subsequent shift to the MAC-MO program. 
a. Award Fees 
An award fee, when applied properly, is used to motivate a contractor’s 
performance in areas that are critical to a successful maintenance availability. When 
using award fees, the government should utilize objective measures to support a 
subjective evaluation of the maintenance contractor’s performance. The contractor can 
then be awarded a fee based on the government’s evaluation of the contractor’s 
performance in the identified critical areas. Award fee contracts are intended to be 
flexible, allowing contracting and program officials to change award fee criteria from one 
evaluation period to the next to both meet the evolving needs of the government and 
ensure the contractor is continually incentivized (GAO, 2005, p. 7).  
Contracts with such incentives require the government to periodically evaluate the 
contractor’s performance during the work period and compare that performance to 
previously established objective criteria. The award fee and incentive fee evaluation 
process outlined in Appendix C allows the government to assess and evaluate the 
contractor’s performance, as well as recognize and reward progress and 
accomplishments. In performing the evaluation, the government can take into 
consideration the contractor’s performance levels as well as the conditions under which 
the performance levels were achieved. The government’s evaluations of the contractor 
may occur solely at the end of the contract, or the contractor may be periodically assessed 
at specified program milestones.   
When an agency is developing the award fee strategy and selecting an award fee 
incentive, it must consider three interrelated factors: (a) the “dollar value, complexity and 
criticality” of the maintenance period, (b) “the availability of [government] resources” for 
monitoring and evaluating contractor performance, and (c) “the benefits expected” as a 
result of government oversight (DON, 2004, p. 1). The requirement for the government to 
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monitor and evaluate the contractor means award fee contracts inherently require 
additional administrative and management effort. As a result of this increased burden on 
the government, award fee contracts “should only be used when the contract amount, 
performance period, and expected benefits warrant the additional administrative and 
management effort” (DON, 2004, p. 1).  
FAR 16.405-2 states that a CPAF contract (a) provides for a fee that consists of a 
base amount that can be fixed at the inception of the contract, if applicable, at the 
contracting officer’s discretion, and (b) allows the contractor to earn an award amount 
during the performance period. The award amount is meant to provide motivation for 
excellence in cost, schedule, and/or technical performance. The customer rates the 
contractor’s performance, and as a result the rating is more subjective in nature. 
An award fee incentive is most suitable when key performance objectives cannot 
be objectively or quantitatively measured, or may change during the course of contract 
performance. There are also a number of factors that determine when an award fee 
contract is the appropriate type of contractual arrangement. The Navy/Marine Corps 
Award-Fee Guide lists the following factors: 
 Contractor motivation—An award fee incentive coupled with identification of 
specific areas that are key to a program’s success provides motivation for the 
contractor to concentrate resources in the areas that are critical to the success 
of the maintenance availability.  
 Administrative cost versus expected benefits—The award fee evaluation 
process requires additional documentation and briefings when compared to 
the monitoring necessary for alternative contract types, leading to higher labor 
requirements and increased administrative costs throughout all award fee 
periods. To determine if an award fee contract should be utilized, an analysis 
should be conducted in accordance with FAR 16.405-2(c) to demonstrate that 
the benefits warrant the increased administrative burden.  
 Contract value—Total contract value may not be the most important 
consideration, and therefore dollar thresholds are to be avoided as a sole 
determinant in selecting use of an award fee contract.  
 Hybrid contracts—A hybrid or combined contract type of award fee and 
incentive fee may be used depending upon the suitability of various portions 
of the contract to differing measurements (e.g., objective/quantitative versus 
subjective/qualitative).  
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 Contractor Performance Appraisal Report System (CPARS)—CPARS should 
be used to ensure that the evaluation process is consistent throughout the 
period of performance, but it shall not be used as part of the award fee criteria.  
 Earned Value Management (EVM)—If EVM is consistent with factors being 
utilized to improve contractor performance, then EVM metrics may be used as 
award fee criteria. There should be consistency between the award fee, 
CPARS, and EVM metrics (DON, 2004, pp. 4–6). 
 
b. Incentive Fees 
As previously mentioned, the CPIF contract provides for a fee to be pre-
negotiated. This initial fee is later adjusted by a formula, and the adjustment is based on 
whether the contractor has over-run or under-run the contract (cost basis). This formula 
adjusts the fee based on any difference between the target cost and the total allowable 
cost as originally agreed upon under the terms of the CPIF contract. Unlike a fixed-price 
incentive contract, a CPIF contract establishes a minimum and maximum limit to the 
amount the fee can be adjusted. Since the fee adjustment is made based on terms agreed 
upon in the CPIF contract, the contractor is incentivized to control costs in order to earn a 
higher fee. This is an objective way to measure performance.  
c. GAO Feedback on DOD Use of Incentives 
Award fee and incentive fee contracts have been used across all agencies and at 
all levels in the DOD to motivate excellent contractor performance, especially in areas 
deemed critical to a program’s success (GAO, 2005). The 2005 GAO Report 06–66, 
DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcome, 
found that the DOD has little evidence to support its claim that award fee and incentive 
fee contracts are improving contractor performance. The GAO report also stated that the 
DOD’s management and evaluation practices undermined the “effectiveness of fees as 
motivational tools,” marginalized the use of award fees and incentive fees in holding 
contractors accountable for outcomes, and wasted taxpayer funds (GAO, 2005, 
“Highlights,” para. 2). Furthermore, programs routinely paid a significant portion of the 
fee for performance levels in categories such as “acceptable” and “satisfactory” despite 
federal regulation and military service guidance stating that the purpose of the award fee 
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or incentive fee is to motivate “excellent” performance (i.e., performance that goes above 
and beyond minimal acceptability; GAO, 2005, p. 3). Poor use of contract incentives 
reduced the effectiveness of award fees and incentive fees as motivational tools for 
performance and compromised the integrity of the process.  
The DOD’s failure to properly administer award and incentive fee contracts 
limited the effectiveness of this type of contractual agreement (GAO, 2005, p. 4). The 
GAO determined that the DOD had no performance measures with which to evaluate or 
compile data on the effectiveness of award and incentive fees. Another issue discovered 
in the 2005 study by the GAO was that the DOD often placed emphasis on such things as 
the “responsiveness of contractor management” to DOD feedback and the “quality of 
contractor proposals, or timeliness of contract data requirements” (GAO, 2005, p. 4) 
instead of defining contractor performance in terms of acquisition cost, schedule, or 
performance (GAO, 2005, p. 4). The report also showed that the DOD had not conducted 
any evaluations on its own to determine the effectiveness of award and incentive fee 
contracts. This resulted in the GAO assertion that the DOD has paid billions in incentive 
fees and award fees without favorably influencing performance outcomes (GAO, 2005, p. 
4). As guidance to improve the performance of incentive and award fee programs, the 
GAO provided the DOD with several recommendations: (a) improve its use of fees by 
tying them to specific desired outcomes in award fee and incentive fee contracts, 
maximizing the contractor’s motivation to perform, and (b) collect data that would allow 
an evaluation of the effectiveness of fees (GAO, 2005, pp. 33–34). 
The findings of the 2005 GAO study and the recommendations therein prompted 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to issue guidance in December 2007 that 
directed agencies to take action to improve the use of incentive contracts. The guidance 
directed agencies to “review and update their acquisition policies” and focused on four 
fundamental practices: (a) linking award fees to acquisition outcomes, (b) prohibiting 
payment for contractor performance judged to be less than satisfactory or not meeting 
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contract requirements, (c) limiting the use of rollover,1 and (d) emphasizing excellent 
performance as opposed to effort (OFPP, 2007, p. 1).  
Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007 (Pub. L. No. 
109–634) implemented award and incentive fee data collection requirements to force the 
DOD to develop a system to properly evaluate the effectiveness of award and incentive 
fees. An Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD[AT&L]) memorandum to the military departments stated that it was the policy of 
the USD(AT&L) that objective criteria would be used, whenever possible, to measure 
contract performance (Assad, 2007, p. 1). The key elements of this memorandum can be 
found in Appendix A.  
After implementation of this guidance, the GAO was asked to (a) identify agency 
actions to revise or develop award fee policy or guidance, (b) assess the consistency of 
contracting practices with the new guidance, and (c) determine the extent of collection, 
analysis, and sharing of award fee information being conducted by government agencies 
(GAO, 2009, p. 2). After reviewing 50 contracts, the GAO (2009) determined that 
“current agency practices for using award fee contracts often are not consistent with the 
new OMB guidance” (p. 3). The GAO study (2009) also found that where revised 
guidance was applied, the DOD would achieve an estimated $450 million of savings by 
“limiting the use of rollover and through tying award fee criteria to acquisition outcomes” 
(p. 3). 
The GAO study also found that practices that were in alignment with the new 
guidance were not being implemented consistently at all levels or across all programs. 
They found that although the DOD was following OMB and internal guidance on the 
collection of data on the use of award fees, it was being used primarily to “respond to 
legislative requirements for information” (GAO, 2009, p. 28) and not as a tool for 
                                                 
1 Rollover is the process by which available, unearned award fee is moved from one evaluation period 
to a subsequent evaluation period. This allows a contractor additional opportunity to earn the previously 
unearned portion of the award fee (DON, 2004, p. 2). 
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evaluating the “effectiveness of award fees as a tool for improving contractor 
performance” or “achieving desired program outcomes” (GAO, 2009, p. 4).  
4. Outcomes in Ship Maintenance 
The MSMO incentive structure varied depending upon whether the particular 
MSMO contract was CPAF or a combination of CPAF and CPIF. The CPAF MSMO 
contract contained a 10% maximum award fee (2% each for technical and schedule 
performance, and 3% each for management and cost performance), and a small business 
utilization fee of 1.232%, for a total possible fee of 11.232%. The CPIF MSMO contract 
still had a total possible fee of 11.232%, but it was made up of a 4% award fee (1.6% for 
technical and 2.4% for management performance) and a 7.232% incentive fee (6% for 
cost and 1.232% for schedule performance; NAVSEA, 2013, p. 5).  
The MSMO contract strategy led to improvements in Navy and industry 
relationships, and contractors began taking ownership of planning and execution. 
However, despite incentives to the contrary, there were still significant issues related to 
costs associated with growth and new work, poorly defined requirements, and trouble 
meeting scheduled milestones (NAVSEA, 2013, p. 5). These were issues the Navy was 
determined to correct with its next contract strategy, MAC-MO. 
D.  MULTIPLE AWARD CONTRACT–MULTIPLE ORDER CONTRACTS 
1. Contract Strategy 
On November 10, 2014, the CNO published OPNAV Instruction 3000.15A, 
which explained and established policy for his newly created optimized fleet response 
plan (OFRP). According to Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command (USFF), 
Admiral Bill Gortney, the OFRP had several intentions, including streamlining the fleet 
inspection and training cycle and instilling stability throughout a 36-month cycle that 
consisted of six months of maintenance, six months of training, and 24 months of 
operational availability. Another intention of the OFRP was to sustain capabilities 
through effective and timely maintenance and modifications (Gortney, 2014, slide 4). The 
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key to maintaining the OFRP’s tight schedule started with the ship maintenance period, 
which indicated the beginning of the OFRP.  
In 2013, although NAVSEA determined that collaboration and ownership had 
improved using the MSMO approach, the Navy lacked the necessary resources required 
to effectively manage the contract (i.e., the manpower required to consistently monitor 
the contractor and accurately rate his performance was not available). In response, 
CNRMC and NAVSEA 21 set out to create an even more efficient and effective 
contracting strategy, MAC-MO. MAC-MO uses FFP competitions with multiple contract 
awards and is intended to keep Navy ship maintenance on track with the OFRP. 
a. Multiple Award Contracts 
MSMO contracts were awarded to a single contractor with multiple options for 
future ship repair. One of the greatest differences with MAC-MO is that the contract is 
awarded to multiple contractors who then compete for task orders.  
Multiple award contracts (MACs) were first introduced into legislation by the 
Federal Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA), and later implemented in FAR Subpart 16.5. 
FASA stated that contracting officers could “award separate task order contracts … for 
the same or similar services to two or more sources” (FASA, 1984, § 2304b). A 1999 
study by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) described the benefits of using 
MACs. Specifically, it stated that MACs allowed the government to continuously use 
competition resulting in “lower prices, better quality, reduced time from requirements 
identification to award, and improved contractor performance in satisfying customer 
requirements” (OFPP, 1999, Ch. 2). 
b. Third-Party Planning 
The MAC-MO contracting strategy uses third-party planning. Under MSMO 
contracts, contracts were planned by the Navy and prime contractors. Now, similar to a 
Lead System Integrator (LSI), a third party will be awarded a CPAF/IF contract for 
planning a specific availability. The draft statement of work (SOW) states that the third-
party planner will be responsible for the following:  
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 availability assessment and planning 
 execution support 
 integrated logistics support 
 maintenance database and feedback analysis 
 special projects 
 long lead-time material procurement and inventory management 
(NAVSEA, 2014, p. 1) 
This is not the first time the Navy has contracted planning services for ship 
maintenance and modernization. The Navy awarded previous contracts for maintenance 
planning, naming certain contractors the planning yard for a particular ship or class. For 
example, the Navy currently has advanced planning contracts with Bath Iron Works for 
DDG51, FFG7, and more recently, the LCS program (Wickenheiser, 2014, para. 2). 
In addition to multiple award contracts and third party planning, the MAC-MO 
incentive structure is different from the FFP and MSMO contract strategies. The Navy 
once again changed its incentive strategy for surface ship maintenance in an effort to 
properly motivate MAC-MO contractors while taking into account the limited 
governmental resources available to manage the contracts. 
2. Incentive Structure 
The MAC-MO maintenance contract is FFP, and therefore contains no incentive 
to exceed is the requirements detailed in the contract, but the third-party planning 
contract associated with MAC-MO contains both award terms and incentive fees.  
The FY 2015 to FY 2019 third-party planning contract proposal for DDG51- and 
CG47-class ships has an award term consisting of a one-year base period, two one-year 
options, and two one-year award term options. Award term options allow the contractor 
to earn the right to continue performance. In other words, if the government deems the 
contractor performed well during evaluation periods, the option exists to add time (i.e., an 
award term) to the contract rather than simply give the contractor an extra fee for good 
performance. The award term options comprise evaluation periods starting at contract 
award to 18 months and from 18 months to one year thereafter. The evaluation criteria 
are made up of quality of work and timeliness, cost performance, and subcontractor 
performance (NAVSEA, 2014, pp. 5–8). 
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The third-party planning contract also has performance incentive fees, and 
according to NAVSEA’s proposed contract, they are “designed to provide economic 
motivation for the contractor to produce high quality products and services on a timely 
basis that support [the] Navy’s maintenance and modernization planning objectives 
(NAVSEA, 2014, p. 2). The incentive fee amounts are made up of the accuracy of the 
work specification (80%) and Master Specification Catalog (MSC) template 
improvement (20%). The work specification quality is based off of JFMM requirements. 
The MSC incentive is to provide incentives for the contractor to submit feedback to the 
government in order to improve current routine maintenance work specifications, which 
will reduce costly contract changes in future maintenance availabilities. 
MAC-MO program officials also expect to award a CPAF contract for emergent 
maintenance, although no contracts have been awarded for this task to date. Emergent 
maintenance is conducted when a ship unexpectedly suffers an equipment or structural 
failure that requires immediate attention. In the past, these types of casualties were 
covered under the main maintenance contract, but the MAC-MO strategy issues a 
separate contract to cover this type of work. This is a more appropriate structure because 
the FFP contract is rigid in nature and demands definitive requirements that cannot be 
determined ahead of time in emergent maintenance. The CPAF contract not only 
provides the flexibility in requirement determination, but also incentivizes the contractor 
to quickly correct the emergent maintenance need.  
3. Expected Outcomes 
NAVSEA expects the MAC-MO strategy to improve ship maintenance 
availabilities in the following ways:  
 improved work package through better defined requirements 
 increased price competition 
 separation of the planning function from the execution function to 
encourage consummate behavior (NAVSEA, 2013, p. 7) 
The MAC-MO strategy is intended to make the improvements listed above in 
order to lower costs, shorten schedules, and improve the overall quality of Navy ship 
maintenance availabilities. 
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E.  SUMMARY 
This chapter defined previous CNO availability contracting methods and 
maintenance outcomes. It also described the use of awards and incentives to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness, along with a description of the new MAC-MO contract 
strategy and expectations for future maintenance availability outcomes. 
  
 26 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 27 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A.  DATA COLLECTION 
The data for this project was collected, processed, and provided by NAVSEA, 
CNRMC Code 400. The data provided by CNRMC was collected from two primary 
sources: (a) the Surface Engineering Maintenance Planning Program (SURFMEPP), and 
(b) the Navy Maintenance Database (NMD). 
The Navy established the SURFMEPP in November 2010 to provide a centralized 
planning tool for surface ship life-cycle management, including ship class maintenance 
and modernization. SURFMEPP provides supporting tools that capture and analyze 
maintenance history and execution and return cost data for each availability, and serves 
as a library of technical-based requirements for each class of ship (NAVSEA, n.d.). The 
class-specific historical data is analyzed and used to improve the budget and scheduling 
aspects of CNO-scheduled maintenance availabilities and is separate from the NMD. 
 The SURFMEPP data for this project is provided to CNRMC in a spreadsheet 
format that is titled “SURFMEPP Availability Completion Tracker W-X-Y-Z (WXYZ) 
data.” CNRMC receives updated WXYZ spreadsheets from SURFMEPP the first week 
of every month. Examples of data fields in the SURFMEPP database that are exported 
into the WXYZ file are class, ship name, start date, and end date of the availability. The 
WXYZ also contains the number of man days and the total dollar requirement of each 
availability. 
The NMD is used by government maintenance teams and contracting officers at 
maintenance activities to plan and execute ship maintenance and repair projects. Its 
primary purpose is to provide for the integration and automation of Supervisor 
Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) planning and execution functions. More specifically, the NMD 
captures cost of growth data and tracks it at the configuration change level. It is also used 
to improve the quality of future work specifications by capturing lessons learned and 
providing growth analysis metrics. Examples of data fields contained in the NMD include 
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class, hull, avail start date, avail end date, avail type, contract type (e.g., MSMO), and 
status (e.g., active, completed). 
B. DEFINING AN OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT MAINTENANCE STRATEGY 
The current metrics used by CNRMC to measure the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the MSMO and MAC-MO contracting strategies are (a) cost growth resulting from 
new work and growth work, (b) percentage of on time award, (c) percentage of on time 
completion, and (d) number of lost operational days. The data source and definition of 
each metric is as follows: 
1. Cost Growth 
Cost growth is the percentage of growth work and new work, measured in dollar 
value, in comparison to the total original contract value. It is calculated by 
dividing the total dollar value of Requests for Contractual Change (RCC) by the 
total dollar value of the contract. This information was retrieved from data in the 
NMD. 
2. On Time Award 
On time award (OTA) tracks the number of days that the contract was awarded 
past the estimated contract award date. It is calculated by subtracting the actual 
award date from the estimated or ideal award date. The data used to determine the 
performance metric was retrieved from the WXYZ file. 
3. On Time Completion 
On time completion measures the percentage of availabilities that were completed 
on time. This metric is calculated by dividing the number of availabilities 
completed on time by the total number of completed availabilities in a given 
period (e.g., FY 2014). The data for this analysis was retrieved from SURFMEPP 
and includes information from all seven of the Navy’s Regional Maintenance 
Centers. 
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4. Lost Operational Days 
Lost operational days (LOD) measures the number of operational days lost as a 
result of a ship’s maintenance availability exceeding the original planned 
availability duration. Trends in this data help predict availability durations and 
execute them as planned. It is calculated by subtracting the planned availability 
duration from the actual availability duration using data from CNO availabilities 
that are closed, as well as CNO availabilities that are active. The data was 
retrieved from both the WXYZ data and NMD. 
C.  ANALYSIS METHOD 
The method of analysis for the project is a comparison of the pertinent metrics 
from MSMO contracts to metrics calculated using the available metrics from the initial 
MAC-MO contracts.2 A comparison of the MSMO metrics to MAC-MO metrics 
determines whether the MAC-MO program shows an improvement in efficiency or 
effectiveness. 
D.   SUMMARY 
This chapter outlines the source of the project data and the methodology that is 
used in the analysis of the data. In addition, it defines the key performance measures 
being used by CNRMC to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of CNO maintenance 
availabilities and their underlying contract vehicle.  
                                                 
2 A comparison to the FFP strategy was not made due to the lack of available data. 
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IV. FINDINGS, RESULTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. DATA ANALYSIS 
In this section, the metrics, which are (1) cost growth resulting from new work 
and growth work, (2) percentage of on time award, (3) percentage of on time completion, 
and (4) number of lost operational days, are presented graphically. The graphs are used to 
evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the MAC-MO contract as it relates to CNO 
maintenance availabilities. 
1. Cost 
The total cost of a maintenance availability is linked directly to technical 
performance and schedule, and as a result is a direct reflection of contractor performance 
and program management. CNRMC identified the percentage of growth and new work as 
a key metric in the evaluation of the performance of the third-party planner, the 
contractor, and program management during CNO availabilities. It is also a valuable 
measure of the effectiveness of the contracting methodology used to identify contract 
requirements and support elements during the planning process, as well as the controls 
established to allow availability managers to effectively control growth and ultimately 
reduce cost overruns. 
As seen in Figure 1, from FY 2013 through FY 2015, the percentage of growth 
and new work of ship maintenance under the MSMO structure averaged 48.33%, with a 
high of 52% in FY 2013 and a low of 44% in FY 2014. By comparison, the data on ship 
maintenance availabilities under a MAC-MO FFP contract indicate a cost growth of 21%. 
Initial indications are that the MAC-MO contract vehicle could result in a 52–60% 







Figure 1.  Percentage of Growth and New Work 
2. On Time Award 
When a contract award is late, it can result in the delay in the commencement of a 
maintenance availability. This can lead to delays in the completion of the overall 
maintenance period as well as to increased costs as contractors push to remain on 
schedule. For this reason, the OTA Days Late metric is used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of maintenance availability and contract managers. 
The graph in Figure 2 shows that the average OTA Days Late for MSMO was as 
low as 11 days in FY 2013 and as high as 21 days in FY 2014, with a three-year average 
of 15 days. The MAC-MO program, based on limited data, has an average OTA Days 
Late measure of 13 days, which is the same level reported under the MSMO program in 
FY 2015. Based on this information, it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion as 
to the effect that the MAC-MO strategy has on improving the OTA of contracts when 
































Figure 2.  Average On Time Award (OTA) Days Late 
3. On Time Completion 
As already expressed, the OFRP emphasizes the importance of schedule. To 
evaluate the performance of the MAC-MO strategy in terms of schedule, the OTC of 
availabilities was compared to that of availabilities contracted using the MSMO strategy. 
As shown in Figure 3, the availabilities contracted using the MAC-MO strategy had a 
33% OTC rate. In comparison, the MSMO strategy has a three-year average OTC rate of 
24.3%, ranging from a low of 18% in FY 2014 to a high of 33% in FY 2015. However, 
the initial indications are that the MAC-MO OTC rate, based on the data available, is 
better than the three-year average under MSMO. The data shows that MAC-MO may 
have resulted in as much as a 45% improvement over FY 2014 MSMO performance; 
however, there is no improvement when compared to FY 2015 MSMO data. 
Additionally, this data metric can be influenced by unforeseen events that affect a ship’s 
maintenance availability that are beyond the scope of the contract, contractor, and 
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Figure 3.  Percentage of On Time Completion (OTC) 
4. Lost Operational Days 
Trends in LOD help predict availability duration and availability execution. The 
lower the number of LOD, the better the fleet can support the OFRP. For these reasons, 
LOD is a useful metric when evaluating the performance of MSMO and MAC-MO 
contract strategies in terms of schedule. The data analysis, as seen in Figure 4, shows that 
the MSMO contracts have a three-year LOD average of 30.7 days, and that the LOD has 
a downward trend from a high of 44 in FY 2013 to a low of 13 for FY 2015. In 
comparison, the initial MAC-MO availabilities have an average LOD of 30, which is 
130% greater than the FY 2015 figure for MSMO availabilities. This could be a result of 
unforeseen growth or new work requirements, as well as a potential learning curve 
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Figure 4.  Average Lost Operational Days (LOD) 
B. DISCUSSION 
The data analysis above examines the performance of the MAC-MO strategy and 
the impact the strategy has on cost, schedule, and quality performance at all levels of the 
maintenance availability.3 To arrive at a conclusion, the data was compared to help 
determine whether the change in ship maintenance contract strategy resulted in 
improvements in efficiency and effectiveness and met the overall objectives of the MAC-
MO program. Based on the data analysis initial indications are that the MAC-MO 
program is more effective at controlling costs based on the percentage of growth and new 
work comparison, but improvements based on the OTA, OTC, and LOD metrics are 
inconclusive or do not exist in the current data. 
One of the key objectives of the MAC-MO strategy was to drive down costs. As 
stated in Chapter 2, this strategy would aid in improvements in cost control through the 
continuous use of competition and the use of a third-party planner. Contractors 
                                                 
3 Data from the USS Porter maintenance availability, completed under an FFP contract, was removed 
from the data analysis due to factors not normally associated with CNO maintenance availabilities. Charts 
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continuously compete to be awarded work under a MAC, while third-party planners 
operate under a CPAF where award fee is based on evaluation criteria consisting of 
quality of work and timeliness, cost performance, and subcontractor performance. Based 
on the data analysis for this project, the MAC-MO strategy, through its continuous use of 
competition and third-party planner incentives, is more effective at controlling growth 
and new work than the MSMO strategy. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the goals of the OFRP was to efficiently 
schedule all required maintenance, training, and evaluations in a manner that would drive 
down costs and increase overall fleet readiness. A driving factor in meeting fleet 
readiness goals is the timely and cost efficient execution of maintenance and 
modernization periods. One of the metrics that is used to measure the time aspect of 
maintenance and modernization availabilities is the OTA calculation. When a contract is 
not awarded or definitized on time, not only are there schedule implications, but also 
contract risk implications. Under an undefinitized contract, the risk to the contract 
increases (e.g., requirement changes, cost overruns, schedule delays) when the contractor 
is authorized to commence work before a final contractual agreement is reached. The data 
in Figure 2 indicates that the OTA Days Late measure for the MAC-MO program is 
similar to that of the MSMO program, indicating that in the early stages of this strategy 
there are no improvements in this area.  
The metrics OTC and LOD not only address the issue of schedule performance, 
but are also indications of how well the third-party planner executed availability 
assessment and planning that led to availability milestones and deadlines being met. The 
results in Figures 3 and 4 do not offer evidence that the MAC-MO strategy of using a 
third-party planner has resulted in improvements in OTC or a reduction in LOD. As a 
result, there are no visible indications of meeting the objective of improvements in 
schedule performance when compared to the MSMO strategy. However, there may be a 
learning curve associated with the early stages of the MAC-MO strategy, and as such, 
further study would be warranted after additional availabilities have been completed. 
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C. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In FY 2014 and FY 2015, NAVSEA executed two Delivery Orders for MAC-MO 
contracts in San Diego, CA. Although both ships were viewed as non-major CNO 
availabilities, NAVSEA Southwest Regional Maintenance Center (SWRMC) collected 
multiple lessons learned for future MAC-MO contracted maintenance availabilities. 
SWRMC identified the following lessons learned and recommendations: 
 There is a learning curve for the third party planner and regional maintenance 
center’s reviewing specifications—multiple requests for specification 
clarification were received by the Navy by the third party planners and 
regional maintenance centers. 
 Long lead time material for more complex availabilities needs to be managed 
differently—not all material can be ordered and scheduled for delivery at the 
award date, and it is challenging to do so before the contract award. 
 NMD access for the third party planner is challenging, and the third party 
planner’s execution of the NMD has a steep learning curve. 
 Ship checks are more important for the MAC-MO contract holders than when 
using MSMO contracts due to the loss of long-term access to a ship/entire 
class. 
 NAVSEA standard items for schedule and associated reports inclusion in the 
request for proposal (RFP) is valuable in determining lowest price technically 
acceptable (LPTA). 
 Leaving enough time between RFP release and submitting offers requires 45 
days to be effective. 
 The current award schedule does not allow the winning contractor to be 
adequately prepared for the Work Package Execution Review (WPER). It is 
recommended that CNO MAC-MOs are awarded at A-60. 
 All new work should be planned by the third party planner. All growth work 
should be planned by the local regional maintenance center (NAVSEA, 2015, 
slides 4–5). 
The majority of SWRMC’s concerns were related to the third party planning 
aspect of MAC-MO. Learning curves and access to information will need to be addressed 
in order for the MAC-MO to be as efficient and effective as initially planned. In addition 
to its third party planning apprehensions, SWRMC also stated that the inclusion of the 
new MAC-MO strategy could considerably impact availability management “without 
significant investment in training and … hiring to approved staffing levels” (NAVSEA, 
2015, slide 2).  
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed the following metrics: (1) cost growth resulting from new 
work and growth work, (2) percentage of OTA, (3) percentage of OTC, and (4) number 
of LOD used to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the MAC-MO contract. 
Lessons learned and recommendations from the MAC-MO pilot program were also 
presented and could be valuable for future MAC-MO contract actions.  
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this research was to present results from appropriate and relevant 
data, specifically information from ongoing and completed MAC-MO contracts. Using 
this data, a comparison was made to previous MSMO contracts, and analysis was 
conducted in order to address the following research questions: 
● Are MAC-MO contracts the most efficient and effective contracting method for 
CNO availabilities? 
● Are MAC-MO contracts meeting their objectives? 
● Are there any best practices from successful MAC-MO contracts? 
The remainder of this paper answers these research questions, provides limitations 
of the study, and suggests areas for future research. 
 
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Research Question 1: Are MAC-MO Contracts the Most Efficient and 
Effective Contracting Method for CNO Availabilities? 
The answer to this research question is “yes” and “no.” The MAC-MO contracts 
are out-performing MSMO in terms of percentage of growth and new work, but initial 
indications are that improvements based on the OTA, OTC, and LOD metrics are 
inconclusive or do not exist in the current data. When MAC-MO is compared to the 
average of the last three fiscal years of MSMO contracts, the results are similar. Although 
there is a 9% increase in OTC, that amount is not large enough for it to be deemed 





Figure 5.  Percentage of Growth and New Work, and Percentage of OTC 
 
Figure 6.  OTA Days Late and LOD 
2. Research Question 2: Are MAC-MO Contracts Meeting Their 
Objectives? 
The answer to this research question is also both “yes” and “no.” As mentioned in 

















































improve the overall quality of Navy ship maintenance availabilities through (a) improved 
work package and requirements generation, (b) increased price competition, and (c) 
separation of the planning function from the execution function to encourage 
consummate behavior (NAVSEA, 2013, p. 7). 
Figure 1 suggests that MAC-MO is more effective at controlling growth and new 
work than the MSMO strategy, and therefore is meeting the Navy’s objective of 
controlling costs. Contractor consummate behavior and increased price competition could 
be loosely connected to all of CNRMC’s metrics, but one can only infer if the objectives 
are being met. Lower rates of growth work and new work may also be attributable to the 
effectiveness of the third party planner at assessing and planning the availability. As 
stated in Research Question 1, initial indications are that improvements based on the 
OTA, OTC, and LOD metrics are inconclusive or do not exist in the current data, and 
therefore Research Question 2 cannot be fully answered. 
3. Research Question 3: Are There Any Best Practices From Past 
Successful MAC-MO Contracts? 
The answer to this research question is “yes.” NAVSEA SWRMC identified 
several lessons learned and presented them at the January 2015 Maintenance and 
Modernization Performance Review (MMPR). SWRMC recognized that the learning 
curve associated with the third party planning aspect of MAC-MO requires attention, and 
it also identified a potential manning shortfall that could impact managing the MAC-MO 
contracts. 
C. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
The primary limitation of this study was the amount of data available for the 
MAC-MO program. This program is considered a pilot program, and the available data 
was limited to two availabilities during FY 2014 and FY 2015 that were contracted using 
the full MAC-MO strategy. The researchers also included five additional ships that were 
contracted using the FFP portion of the MAC-MO strategy during the same FY 2014 
through FY 2015 timeframe. This data limitation precludes any ability to identify trends 
that may indicate areas of improvement, inefficiency, or effectiveness over time for the 
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MAC-MO program that would allow the researchers to make a final determination as to 
the benefits of this strategy. 
A second limitation of the study is the metrics used by the researchers to try to 
answer the research question. The metrics used are indicators of the performance or 
progress of a ship’s maintenance availability, but they may not necessarily be the best 
indications of the success of a particular contract strategy. In particular, these metrics do 
not allow for an analysis of the award of incentives to the contractor based on their 
performance. Both the MSMO and MAC-MO strategies contain award fee and incentive 
fee elements, and an analysis of award fee plans and actual award fee earned by the 
contractor in addition to any profit or fee earned from contract incentives might prove 
beneficial to answering the research question. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this report, the researchers attempted to determine (a) if the objectives of the 
MAC-MO contract strategy were met, and (b) if the MAC-MO strategy has led to 
improved effectiveness and efficiency of CNO maintenance contract procurement. As 
noted above, current MAC-MO data is limited and therefore allows for the following 
areas worthy of consideration for further research: 
 Increase the number of MAC-MO contracts analyzed beyond the limited 
data set presented in this project. 
 Perform an in-depth comparison to other commercial and military services 
maintenance procurement contracting methods. 
 Develop metrics that are directly tied to the stated MAC-MO objectives. 
 Analyze award fee and incentive fee elements of MAC-MO and MSMO 
contracts. 
 Analyze the third party planner element of MAC-MO to include contract 
structure, incentive plan, and performance measurement plans. 
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APPENDIX A.  KEY ELEMENTS OF MEASURING CONTRACT 
PERFORMANCE 
1. A multiple incentive type contract containing incentive fee and award fee criteria 
is appropriate to use in instances where objective criteria exist and the contracting officer 
and program manager wish to evaluate and incentivize elements of performance that are 
subjective in nature. 
2. A CPAF contract is appropriate for use when it is determined that objective 
criteria do not exist. In this case, the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) or a delegated 
approval authority must sign a determination and finding that “the work to be performed 
is such that it is neither feasible nor effective to devise predetermined objective incentive 
targets applicable to cost, technical performance, or schedule.” 
3. The following award fee parameters shall apply to all award fee provisions: 
Rating  Award Fee Pool Earned 
Unsatisfactory    0% 
Satisfactory    No greater than 50% 
Good     50%–75% 
Excellent    75%–90% 
Outstanding    90%–100% 
4. Definitions of Ratings 
a. Unsatisfactory—Contractor has failed to meet the basic requirements 
(minimum essential) of the contract. 
b. Satisfactory—Contractor has met the basic requirements of the contract. 
c. Good—Contractor has met the basic contract requirements and at least 50% of 
the award fee criteria established in the award fee plan. 
d. Excellent—Contractor has met the basic contract requirements and at least 
75% of the award fee criteria. 
e. Outstanding—Contractor has met the basic contract requirements and at least 
90% of the award fee criteria. (Assad, 2007, pp. 2–3) 
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APPENDIX B.  DATA ANALYSIS CHARTS INCLUDING USS 
PORTER 
The USS Porter maintenance availability was completed under an FFP contract, 
but was removed from the data analysis due to several factors not normally associated 
with typical maintenance contracts. The USS Porter had significant collision damage, 
which resulted in non-standard work items and increased growth and new work. The data 
presented in Figures 7–10 includes the USS Porter. 
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Figure 8.  Average OTA Days Late (Including USS Porter) 
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APPENDIX C.  PROCESS FOR DETERMINING AWARD FEE AND 
INCENTIVE FEE AMOUNTS 
 
A. General Process for Determining Award Fee Amounts 
 
1. DOD officials provide input on the contractor’s performance for an 
evaluation period that just ended. 
2. Program officials compile data and prepare a summary or briefing for the 
award fee evaluation board. 
3. Award fee evaluation board convenes; contractors may submit a self-
assessment and brief the board. 
4. Award fee evaluation board considers the input; output is a recommended 
fee rating for the contractor. 
5. Fee-determining official (FDO) makes an initial fee determination; 
contracting officer is notified of determination. 
6. Contractor notified of initial determination; contractor has option to appeal 
the decision. 
7. FDO makes final determination. 
8. Contracting officer issues final determination to contractor; contract 
modification authorizing payment is processed. (GAO, 2005, p. 8) 
 
B. General Process for Determining Incentive Fee Amounts 
 
1. At contract completion, DOD contracting officer compares actual cost to the 
target cost specified in the contract. 
2. If actual cost matches target cost, contract is awarded an amount called the target 
fee or “target profit.” 
3. If actual cost falls below target cost, a formula is applied with a share ratio that 
specifies the amount the target fee (or profit) is increased for each dollar below 
the target cost. 
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4. If actual cost exceeds target cost, a formula is applied with a share ratio that 
specifies the amount the target fee (or profit) is reduced for every dollar above 
target cost. 
5. Contract modification processed authorizing payment. (GAO, 2005, p. 9) 
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